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1. Introduction
Poverty and underdevelopment are South Africa’s greatest challenges. These 
are inextricably linked to uneven access to adequate public services. By all 
accounts, South Africa has made impressive progress in extending access to 
basic services to marginalised communities (see Table 1 below). However, the 
main challenge remains the severe inequality in access to basic services across 
different demographic segments of the population of 52 million inhabitants.1
A significant part of South Africa’s population reside in informal settlements, 
often with little or no access to adequate public services such as piped water, 
electricity, sanitation, street lightning and others.
Table 1: Key Statistics2
Type of service Percentage of national population with access
Access to piped water 89.9%
Access to improved sanitation 77.9%
Access to mains electricity 85.4%
Use solid fuels for cooking 10.9%
Dwelling owned 66.4%
Living in formal dwellings 77.7%
Municipal refuse removal 66.0%
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Part III: Comparative Perspectives
1  R C Nnadozie, ‘Access to basic services in post-apartheid South Africa: What has changed? Measuring on a relative basis’ 
(2013) 16 The African Statistical Journal 98.
2  Statistics South Africa, Household Service Delivery Statistics (2015) http://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=739&id=2 
(accessed 13 October 2015).
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At the same time, the South African Constitution contains socio-economic 
rights. They relate to housing, education, shelter, food, water, health care and 
a safe and healthy environment.3 These rights are justiciable, in the sense that 
they can be invoked in court and the court may fashion a remedy in response 
to a finding that the right has been violated. Indeed they are being used 
successfully by communities and civil society groupings to litigate against 
organs of state.
The socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights are often phrased as rights for 
which the state must take reasonable measures, within its available resources 
to achieve the progressive realisation of this right. However, ‘the state’ in the 
South African context is constituted as national, provincial and local spheres of 
government. Each of these spheres has constitutionally guaranteed functions 
and powers, which, for ease of comparison with Kenya can indeed be termed a 
form of devolution.4 This combination of legally enforceable socio-economic 
rights and constitutionally entrenched devolution creates an important and 
rather unique dynamic in the Constitution. This is because the realisation 
of socio-economic rights often has significant budgetary consequences for 
organs of state throughout the various levels or spheres of government. The 
combination of legally enforceable socio-economic rights and constitutionally 
entrenched devolution is something that the constitutions of Kenya and South 
Africa have in common. A brief perusal of South Africa’s experience and the 
jurisprudence of its Constitutional Court surrounding the intersection of 
socio-economic rights and the constitutional division of powers may thus be 
of use to the Kenyan judiciary.
In this chapter, it will be argued that the jurisprudence of the South 
African Constitutional Court has affected the intersection between socio-
economic rights and the constitutional division of functions and powers. 
This has occurred in particular with regard to the functions and powers 
of local government. The impact of enforcement of socio-economic rights 
on the functions and powers of local government has been threefold. First, 
it can be argued that South Africa has seen ‘devolution through rights’, 
whereby the Constitutional Court seems to have decentralised functions 
to subnational governments through the enforcement of the Bill of Rights. 
Secondly, it will be argued that the Court has formulated, on the basis of the 
division of powers and functions, a new right that can be invoked against 
subnational governments. A new ‘right to receive basic (local) services’ seems 
to have emerged in the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence. Thirdly, the 
Constitutional Court has formulated standards for the exercise of powers 
3  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa1996 ss 24, 26, 27, 28 and 29.
4  As aboves 40(1).
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by municipalities and based these standards on the Bill of Rights and the 
socio-economic rights in particular. Before elaborating on the above three 
trends, the chapter provides a short outline of the constitutional framework 
for provincial and local government, which should assist in the subsequent 
analysis of the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence.
2. Constitutional Framework for Provincial and Local 
Government
South Africa’s nine provinces, where legislative powers are exercised by 
directly elected provincial legislatures and executive powers by an indirectly 
elected Premier, are responsible for the functional areas, listed in Schedules 4 
and 5 of the Constitution.5 Matters not listed in any of the two Schedules are 
the responsibility of the national government.6
With regard to the functional areas listed in Schedule 4, national and 
provincial governments have concurrent legislative and executive authority: 
both national and the provincial governments have the same (legislative 
and executive) powers over the same territory.7 Conflicts between national 
and provincial laws on the same matter are ultimately resolved by the 
Constitutional Court.8 With regard to the functional areas listed in Schedule 
5 provincial powers are exclusive.9 National government is barred from 
exercising any legislative or executive powers in any of the functional areas 
in Schedule 5, unless exceptional circumstances merit national legislative 
intervention.10
Local government in South Africa is constitutionally recognised and its powers 
constitutionally protected.11 Local government consists of municipalities, 
headed by directly elected municipal councils.12 They are charged by the 
Constitution with critical service delivery responsibilities, such as the 
delivery of water, electricity, sanitation, municipal roads, street lightning etc. 
Municipalities derive their legislative and executive authority with respect to 
these services directly from the Constitution which contains a list of local 
government matters.13
5  As above s 104(1)(b)(i) and (ii).
6  As above ss 44(1)(a)(ii).
7  As above ss 44(1)(a)(ii) and 104(1)(b)(i).
8  As above s 146.
9  As above s104(1)(b)(ii).
10  As above s104(1)(b) and 42(2).
11  As above Chapter 7ss 151 and 156.
12  As above s 157.
13  As above s 156(1), read with shcs 4, Part B, and5, Part B.
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As mentioned above, Schedules 4 and 5 contain concurrent national and 
provincial and exclusive provincial powers respectively. However, they also 
contain the above mentioned local government powers, which are nestled 
away in Part B of Schedule 4 and Part B of Schedule 5. In the case of Schedule 
4B matters, national and provincial governments may only regulate these 
functional areas to “see to the effective performance by municipalities of their 
functions” or to provide for the monitoring of or support to municipalities.14 
In the case of Schedule 5B matters, it is only the provincial government 
that may regulate. Implicit in South Africa’s system of local government 
is a high degree of self-sustainability with municipalities expected to raise 
a considerable portion of their revenue from property taxes and service 
fees, revenue generating powers that are constitutionally guaranteed.15 
As a result, local government budgets are indeed -to a significant degree 
-self-funded. For example, 73 percent of the 2014-2015 local government 
budgets was funded out of own revenue.16 It must be said, however, that local 
government’s ability to raise revenue varies significantly between urban and 
rural local governments with many rural local governments relying to a very 
significant degree on national government funding. Additional funding is 
provided by the national government, in the form of an unconditional grant 
which is called the equitable share,17 using terminology and on the basis of 
equalisation principles that are very similar to the relevant provisions in the 
Kenyan Constitution. Furthermore, local governments receive a myriad of 
conditional grants that are earmarked for specific purposes.
The Constitution thus divides powers and functions between national, 
provincial and local government by listing concurrent national and provincial 
powers in Schedule 4 and exclusive provincial powers in Schedule 5 of the 
Constitution. The latter part of each schedule then contains the areas over 
which local government has constitutional authority. Local government’s 
constitutionally allocated powers revolve around matters such as the provision 
of electricity, fire fighting, municipal health services, storm water management, 
municipal roads, refuse removal, water and sanitation. Changes to this 
division of powers and functions between the three spheres of government 
can be made, though. The Constitution provides for the instrument of 
assignment, in terms of which the national or provincial governments may 
transfer responsibility for a function to another sphere of government.18 
14  As above ss 155(6),- 155(7).
15  As aboves 229.
16  National Treasury, Budget Review 2014(2015) 100.
17  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa1996ss 214 and 229.
18  Sections 44(1)(iii), 99, 104 and 126 of the Constitution provide for the assignment of national or provincial functions to 
local government or to specific municipalities.
Commentary and Analysis - Book.indb   196 15/12/2015   2:51 PM
The Bill of Rights and County Governments: Emerging Jurisprudence from the Courts
197
With respect to the assignment of functions to local government, there are 
statutory provisions that seek to ensure that adequate resources accompany 
the assignment.19 This is to avoid that local governments are saddled with 
additional functions without resources to carry them out. In practice, 
municipalities perform a range of functions ‘outside’ their constitutional 
mandate on the basis of formal and informal mechanisms such as agency 
arrangements and sector-specific instruments.
The Constitution of Kenya uses similar concepts to arrange the functions 
and powers of the national government and the counties. Constitutional 
mechanisms such as concurrency, exclusivity, assignment and equitable 
division of revenue also feature in the Constitution of Kenya. This enhances 
the scope for a useful comparison between the two countries.
3. Devolution Through Rights
The first manifestation of the impact of the enforcement of socio-economic 
rights on the division of functions and powers relates to what can be termed 
‘devolution through rights’. The background to this is the following question: 
given that the socio-economic rights in the South African Constitution are 
phrased as rights that can be enforced against “the state”, does this mean that 
they thus be claimed from any sphere of government that makes up “the 
state”? To underscore the suggestion that this question may be relevant for the 
Kenyan context, a quick excursion to the Kenyan Constitution may be useful. 
Article53(1) of the Constitution of Kenya provides that “[e]very child has the 
right to … shelter”. It does not specify whether it is the national government 
or the counties that bear the duty to ensure the realisation of this right. At the 
same time, there are provisions elsewhere in the Constitution, particularly in 
Schedule IV that set out an intricate division of powers between the central 
government and counties with respect to housing and shelter. For example, 
Schedule IV provides that the national government is responsible for 
“housing policy” and that the counties are responsible for “country planning 
and development, including … housing”. The question could thus be: can this 
right to shelter be claimed from the county, from the national government or 
from both?
In South Africa, the first time the issue arose as to which sphere of government 
is responsible for the realisation of the right of access to housing was in 
the context of the landmark Grootboom matter before the Constitutional 
Court.20 The judgment is one of the Court’s most well-known judgments 
19  Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 s 9-10A.
20  Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC).
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and its content and impact have been well traversed in literature around the 
world.21 It will thus not be comprehensively presented here except for the 
elements, essential to understand its significance for the topic of this paper. 
In essence the matter revolved around a community that had been rendered 
homeless as a result of eviction from land that had been earmarked for 
development. They sued government to assert that their right of access to 
housing had been violated. The Constitutional Court agreed and, in applying 
a test of reasonableness, held that government’s housing programme was not 
reasonable. The key reason for this was that the housing programme focused 
exclusively on medium and long term progress in the delivery of low cost 
housing and didn’t cater for the destitute who found themselves in deplorable 
circumstances.22All three spheres of government were cited in the application 
and the Court spent a considerable amount of time engaging counsel on the 
question as to who was responsible for delivering which component of the 
right to housing. In the judgment, the Court opted to leave the matter to the 
three spheres of government to work out with reference to the principles of 
cooperative governance that are embedded in the Constitution:
What constitutes reasonable legislative and other measures must 
be determined in the light of the fact that the Constitution creates 
different spheres of government: national government, provincial 
government and local government. … The Constitution allocates 
powers and functions amongst these different spheres emphasising 
their obligation to co-operate with one another in carrying out their 
constitutional tasks. In the case of housing, it is a function shared 
by both national and provincial government. Local governments 
have an important obligation to ensure that services are provided in 
a sustainable manner to the communities they govern. A reasonable 
programme therefore must clearly allocate responsibilities and tasks to 
the different spheres of government and ensure that the appropriate 
financial and human resources are available. … Thus, a co-ordinated 
state housing programme must be a comprehensive one determined 
by all three spheres of government in consultation with each other as 
contemplated by Chapter 3 of the Constitution.23
While this resolved the matter in the context of Grootboom, the question as to 
who is responsible for the realisation of the right to housing, kept rearing its 
21  See for example G Van Bueren, ‘Housing’ in M H Cheadle et al (eds) South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights 
(2014) 21,2; C Mbazira, ‘Grootboom: a paradigm of individual remedies versus reasonable programmes’ (2011) 26(1) 
Southern African Public Law 60-80.
22  As above, Van Bueren above n 21.
23  Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC)paras 39-40.
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head. This is so particularly because many municipalities are deeply involved 
in the delivery of low cost housing. Not only do they naturally provide a basket 
of services related to housing (such as water, sanitation, storm water drainage, 
roads, local public transport and town planning), they often carry out housing 
projects on behalf of provincial governments. In addition, legislation such as 
the Prevention of Illegal Eviction From and Unlawful Occupation of Land 
Act (PIE),24 the key function of which it is to ensure that no eviction takes 
place without a court order made after considering all the circumstances,25 
draws municipalities into legal battles over evictions.26 In terms of PIE and the 
jurisprudence that has given effect to it, municipalities have become involved 
in -
•	 providing	 alternate/emergency	 housing	 for	 occupiers	 who	 would	 be	
rendered homeless by an eviction order;27
•	 mediating	in	eviction	proceedings;28 and
•	 placing	 information	before	 the	courts	relating	 to	 the	circumstances	of	
vulnerable unlawful occupiers in eviction cases.
The municipality is thus part of the search for alternative accommodation 
when an application for an eviction order reaches the court. In terms of the 
law and as a result of practice, municipalities not only engage daily with issues 
related to the delivery of social housing but also with the question as to how to 
ameliorate the plight of those rendered homeless by evictions. With reference 
to the fact that ‘housing’ is listed in the Constitution as a function of national 
and provincial governments concurrently, municipalities have often argued 
that this constitutes an “unfunded mandate”; that is a transfer of functions to 
local government without making adequate funding arrangements.
In 2011, more than a decade after the Grootboom decision, which had left it 
to the three spheres of government to resolve this issue amongst them, the 
question came to the Constitutional Court very directly. This time, the setting 
was the City of Johannesburg where a community had been evicted by a 
private company from private land. In the Blue Moonlight matter the destitute 
community approached the City of Johannesburg for temporary emergency 
accommodation.29 The City refused to accept responsibility. It claimed that it 
would be untenable for the City to be held responsible for the consequences of 
24  Republic of South Africa, Prevention of Illegal Eviction From and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 1998 (“PIE”).
25  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa1996 s26(3).
26  Republic of South Africa, Prevention of Illegal Eviction From and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 1998 section 4(2)..
27  See section 4(7) of PIE in terms of which the Court seized with the eviction matter must consider whether the 
municipality can make land available for relocation.
28  Republic of South Africa, Prevention of Illegal Eviction From and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 1998 7(1).
29  City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd and Another 2012 (2) BCLR 150 
(CC); See also Van Bueren, above n 21, 21.8.
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each private eviction as it had not budgeted for the type of assistance that was 
required. Essentially, it wanted the Court to pronounce that it was the national 
and provincial government that should be ordered to provide emergency 
housing, not the City. Key to the City’s argument was the location of ‘housing’ 
in Schedule 4A of the Constitution thus rendering it a function over which 
national and provincial governments exercise powers concurrently.30The 
Constitutional Court disagreed with this argument. It held that the City was 
indeed responsible and that it ought to find alternative accommodation. The 
City could not evade its responsibility for the realisation of the right of access 
to housing on the basis of the argument that housing is not part of its original 
constitutional mandate. It based its judgment on a combined reading of the 
right of access to housing and the housing legislation which sets out functions 
for local government with respect to emergency accommodation. 
… the City has both the power and the duty to finance its own 
emergency housing scheme. Local government must first consider 
whether it is able to address an emergency housing situation out of 
its own means. The right to apply to the province for funds does not 
preclude this. The City has a duty to plan and budget proactively for 
situations like [this].31
The Court thus made it clear that municipalities are constitutionally 
responsible for at least certain components of the housing function. It can 
be argued that this is a form of devolution of function to local government, 
not by means of the instrument of assignment as set out in sections 44(1)
(iii), 99, 104 and 126 of the Constitution but through the operation of the 
Bill of Rights, enforced by the Constitutional Court. The municipality’s 
responsibility is based on its responsibility to protect the vulnerable and the 
destitute and it is duty bound to obtain funds from national and provincial 
governments to exercise this function or budget own revenue for it.
4.  A New ‘Right to Basic Municipal Services’
The second jurisprudential trend that has affected the division of powers has 
been the formulation of what can be termed a new ‘right to basic municipal 
services’ by the Constitutional Court. ‘Basic municipal services’ could be 
defined as those services which are “necessary to ensure an acceptable 
and reasonable quality of life and, if not provided, would endanger public 
30  City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd and Another 2012 (2) BCLR 150 
(CC) at para 50.
31  City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd and Another 2012 (2) BCLR 150 
(CC) para 67.
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health or safety or the environment” as is the definition in local government 
legislation.32 The Bill of Rights contains rights to housing, shelter, food, water, 
health care and a safe and healthy environment. It goes without saying that 
the content of ‘basic municipal services’ is not identical to the socio-economic 
rights in the Bill of Rights. In many respects it encompasses more than that. 
For example, even if one would be prepared to argue that there is no right of 
access to electricity in the Bill of Rights,33 it can certainly not be argued that 
electricity is not a basic municipal service. 
What can be discerned in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court 
pertaining to local government services is that the Court sees the delivery of 
basic municipal services as an enforceable duty on the part of municipalities. 
For example, in the Mkontwana judgment, dealing with the instruments for 
local governments to secure revenue, the Court remarked that “municipalities 
are obliged to provide water and electricity to residents in their area as a 
matter of public duty”.34 In the Joseph judgment,35 the argument is even clearer. 
In this case the municipality had disconnected electricity to a block of flats in 
response to non-payment by the owner. The result was that the tenants, who 
had paid for electricity to the owner, were being deprived of electricity.36 The 
Constitutional Court resolved the matter with reference to the obligation on 
local government to provide basic services. The Court explained the origins 
of this obligation: “The obligation borne by local government to provide basic 
municipal services is sourced in both the Constitution and legislation”.37 This 
obligation is not in the Bill of Rights but sourced from section 152 and 153 
of the Constitution where the developmental duties of local government 
are set out. These provisions are part of the institutional arrangements the 
Constitution makes with regard to local government. 
The Joseph judgment makes it clear that, in formulating the duty to provide 
basic municipal services, the Court does not conceive of a state obligation 
that cannot be invoked in court. It clearly recognises the concomitant right 
to claim the fulfilment of that obligation. This obligation and therefore the 
right to claim the fulfilment is aimed specifically at local government because 
no other sphere of government delivers ‘basic municipal services’. It is not 
32  Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 s 1 “basic municipal services” of the Local Government.
33  Even though it can be argued convincingly that access to basic electricity is indispensable to the realisation of other 
important human rights including the right to dignity of the person, the right to health, and the right to water.
34  Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality2005 (1) SA 530 (CC); 2005 (2) BCLR 150 (CC) at para 38 and 
52 (emph. added).
35  Joseph and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others2010 (3) BCLR 212 (CC); 2010 (4) SA 55 (CC).
36  N Steytler& J De VisserLocal Government Law of South Africa 9-7; M Bishop & J Brickhill, ‘Constitutional law’ in (2010) 
Annual Survey of South African Law 199-202.
37  Joseph and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others2010 (3) BCLR 212 (CC); 2010 (4) SA 55 (CC) at para 34 (emph 
added).
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directly based on a specific provision of the Bill of Rights but on (1) local 
government’s developmental mandate in the Constitution, (2) statutes that 
give further content to that and (3) indirectly on the rights of access to 
housing, food and water. This must then mean that a municipality can be 
sued for not providing ‘basic municipal services’, even though the right is not 
explicitly listed as a right in the Constitution.
5. Rights Based Service Delivery Standards
The third manifestation of the courts influencing the division of powers and 
functions relates to the formulation of standards for service delivery that are 
directly based on the content of socio-economic rights. As was explained 
earlier, the Constitution delineates a regulatory role for national and provincial 
governments in relation to local government. National and provincial 
governments may regulate local government’s constitutional functions “see to 
the effective performance by municipalities of their functions” or to provide 
for the monitoring of or support to municipalities.
What has emerged in the jurisprudence is that the courts formulate principles 
and standards that essentially also regulate how municipalities ought to 
deliver services. However, these principles and standards are formulated on 
the basis of the imperatives of the Bill of Rights. When a court issues rights-
based service delivery standards it does not add functions to a subnational 
government’s portfolio of constitutional functions and neither does it add 
substantive rights to the rights contained in the Bill of Rights. Instead, it 
formulates standards that are not necessarily contained in statutory law but 
become judge-made standards, directly based on the Bill of Rights.
There are many instances of the courts issuing broad, rights based standards 
for municipalities to follow when delivering services but two are mentioned 
in particular. The first is the Constitutional Court’s judgment in Mazibuko.38 
The case dealt with the introduction, by the City of Johannesburg, of pre-
paid water meters in Phiri, an area in Soweto. Pre-paid water meters may be 
attractive for the local authority from a cost recovery point of view but their 
very nature means that those who cannot pay for water are left without access 
to the most basic of human needs. In implementing the system, the City of 
Johannesburg had ensured that, despite the pre-paid system, each household 
would have access to 6000 litres per month free of charge.39 This was broadly 
in line with the above mentioned national policy and the City’s own policy.
38  Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others2010 (3) BCLR 239 (CC); 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC).
39  As above para 167.
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The residents of Phiri approached the Constitutional Court and claimed that 
the City’s decision and implementation of the pre-paid water system was 
unconstitutional for violating the rights of access to water. The Constitutional 
Court disagreed and held that the City’s free basic water policy and the 
implementation of the pre-paid water metering system did not violate the 
right of access to water.40For the purposes of this chapter, the focus is on how 
the Court formulated standards for service delivery. For example, the Court 
had to review the adequacy of the free allocation 6000 litres per household 
per month. The Court acknowledged that this would be insufficient for large 
households, but, based on average household sizes, considered it sufficient to 
pass constitutional muster.41 However, the Court also issued a stern warning 
to the City of Johannesburg (and thereby to all municipalities) that the policy 
on free basic water may not remain static. Socio-economic rights are to be 
realised “progressively” and the City was therefore duty bound to continuously 
review its free basic water allocation. 
Not only must government show that the policy it has selected is 
reasonable, it must show that the policy is being reconsidered consistent 
with the obligation to “progressively realise” social and economic rights 
in mind. A policy that is set in stone and never revisited is unlikely 
to be a policy that will result in the progressive realisation of rights 
consistently with the obligations imposed by the social and economic 
rights in our Constitution.42
The second example of judge-made service delivery standards relates to the 
Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence surrounding ‘meaningful engagement’. 
Essentially, the principle of ‘meaningful engagement’ requires organs of state 
to engage meaningfully with citizens when decisions are made that impact on 
their enjoyment of rights. It is thus a judge-made standard, not explicitly listed 
as such in the specific legislation on that particular service but formulated 
and applied by the courts on the basis of the Bill of Rights. It was developed 
by the Constitutional Court in cases involving evictions, particularly large 
scale evictions where communities are ‘temporarily’ relocated in order to 
facilitate new housing projects. In order for those eviction arrangements to 
pass constitutional muster, there should have been ‘meaningful engagement’ 
with the affected communities. One of the key judgments on ‘meaningful 
engagement’ is Olivia Road,43 in which residents of two buildings in the 
City of Johannesburg challenged a decision by the City to evict them on 
40  As above para 166-169.
41  As above para 86-89.
42  As abovepara 162.
43  Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others 2008 5 BCLR 475 (CC).
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the grounds that the buildings they occupied were unsafe. Two days after 
hearing arguments in the case, the Constitutional Court issued an interim 
order, crafted in general terms, forcing the parties to engage meaningfully and 
report back to the Court. The Court instructed the parties to put the following 
at the centre of their discussions: “to alleviate the plight of the applicants 
who live in the two buildings concerned in this application by making the 
buildings as safe and as conducive to health as is reasonably practicable”.44 
The parties conducted the engagement and reached a settlement, which 
was confirmed by the Court. The agreement contained interim measures to 
secure the safety of the building at the City’s expense45 and to provide the 
occupiers with alternative accommodation in the inner City of Johannesburg. 
In elaborating on the engagement process, the Court stated that it must 
be tailored to the particular circumstances of each situation: “[T]he larger 
the number of people potentially to be affected by eviction, the greater the 
need for structured, consistent and careful engagement”.46 Furthermore, the 
process must be transparent: “[T]he provision of a complete and accurate 
account of the process of engagement including at least the reasonable efforts 
of the municipality within the process would ordinarily be essential”.47
Meaningful engagement has become a standard that finds application in 
contexts, other than evictions. Essentially, it applies whenever an organ of 
state takes a decision with regard to service delivery and that decision directly 
impacts on the enjoyment of rights of certain specific communities, either 
positively or negatively. The case of Beja is an example of the application of 
this principle.48 The case revolved around the City of Cape Town’s decision 
to build toilets for an informal settlement community in Makhaza, which is 
part of Khayelitsha, a township on the outskirts of Cape Town. Ordinarily 
such a decision by the City would be welcomed was it not that the toilets were 
built without walls, leaving the community members with an undignified 
and dangerous situation. Members of the community took the City and 
the provincial government to court, arguing that their constitutional rights 
were violated with this decision and the implementation thereof. The City, in 
defending the curious practice of building toilets without walls, argued that it 
was based on what could be termed a ‘self-help’ deal. The affected community 
had apparently agreed to build the enclosures, so the City’s argument went, if 
the City would provide the actual toilets.49
44  As above para 5.
45  It dealt with issues such as the installation of toilets, potable water, waste disposal services, fire extinguishers and a 
once-off operation to clean and sanitise the properties.
46  Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others 2008 5 BCLR 475 (CC)  para 19.
47  As abovepara 21.
48  Beja and Others v Premier of the Western Cape and Others[2011] 3 All SA 401 (WCC); 2011 (10) BCLR 1077 (WCC).
49  As abovepara 77.
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This is when the High Court applied the principle of ‘meaningful engagement’: 
had the City meaningfully engaged with the affected members of the 
community before accepting or recording that an ‘agreement’ with them 
existed? Upon scrutinising the history of the conclusion of the ‘agreement’ 
between the City and the affected community, it appeared that it was based 
on a small number of poorly attended and poorly recorded community 
meetings. The City could not prove that very serious considerations such as 
the need to prioritise the rights to dignity, safety and privacy were actually 
taken into consideration. In addition, there was no sign of specific attention 
being paid to the most vulnerable members of the community, such as the 
elderly, in designing this service delivery mechanism. On the basis of these 
and other considerations, the Court concluded that the City had failed in its 
duty to meaningfully engage the members of the community who stood to be 
affected by its decision.50
The above three judgments are examples of the courts formulating and 
applying standards for service delivery based on the Bill of Rights. In the 
Mazibuko judgment, the Constitutional Court formulated a standard for 
service delivery based on the principle of ‘progressive realisation’ of socio-
economic rights: a city’s policy on the allocation of free basic water may not 
be static but must be reviewed continually. In the Olivia Road judgment, the 
Court instructed the parties to an impeding eviction to meaningfully engage 
around the plight of those were to be evicted as well as the objectives the 
government wished to pursue with the eviction. In the Beja judgment, the 
High Court tested an agreement between the municipality and a community 
against the standard of ‘meaningful engagement’ and concluded it did not 
pass muster. In doing so the Court insisted on service delivery mechanisms 
that are genuinely participatory.
6. Conclusion
The above three trends in the jurisprudence indicate that there is a dynamic 
relationship, mediated by the courts, between the constitutional division of 
powers between the three spheres of government and the Bill of Rights. At 
times, the courts seem to have expanded the list of responsibilities of local 
government. In other cases the courts extrapolated new rights from provisions 
dealing with the division of powers and arguably expanded the Bill of Rights. 
Lastly, the courts have formulated and applied rights-based service delivery 
standards.
50  As above paras 77-106.
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So are the courts going too far? Are they overstepping their role and 
interfering in processes that are best left to the legislature and the executive? 
For example, is the Constitutional Court interfering in the delicate process of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations by making municipalities responsible for 
aspects of the housing function (namely emergency housing)? For example, 
Van Bueren criticises the Blue Moonlight:
This judgment is surprising because of its lack of attention to the 
polycentric implications of the order, namely that evictions by private 
landowners could hold significant implications for the City’s housing 
budget in general and its ability to provide permanent housing in 
particular. Furthermore, there was an absence of any consideration 
of the manner in which this judgment transfers the social costs of the 
private landowner acquiring dilapidated buildings from the former to 
the City.
Indeed, one may point at the fact that courts generally do not have the 
instruments, nor the expertise to engage with the myriad of complexities 
surrounding intergovernmental funding arrangements, let alone craft a 
detailed intergovernmental funding arrangement to deal with the financial 
consequences of its decision. 
However, it is argued that such an argument, while perhaps attractive from 
the point of view of the need for predictable and properly researched and 
negotiated intergovernmental fiscal arrangements, ignores that these 
outcomes are the inevitable result of a transformative Constitution with a Bill 
of Rights at its heart. The Constitutional Court has consistently ruled that the 
various sections and parts of the Constitution must be read harmoniously 
whenever possible. This also applies when the one provision is part of the Bill 
of Rights and the other provision is part of the Constitution’s institutional 
arrangements. It cannot be that institutional arrangements trump provisions 
of the Bill of Rights or that institutional arrangements play no role in the 
interpretation of the Bill of Rights.
This does not mean, however, that complaints such as local government’s 
objection that the emergency housing mandate is an unfunded mandate 
should not be taken seriously. As explained in the introduction to this chapter, 
municipalities have limited own revenue and receive grant funding premised 
on a certain portfolio of constitutional functions. Additional responsibilities 
must be properly costed and funded. 
The objections around the unfunded mandate may not, however, result 
in a diminution of constitutional rights. When organs of state seek to 
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evade responsibility for the realisation of those economic and social rights 
where they are clearly invested and do so on the basis of arguments around 
competencies and intergovernmental relations, there is a real threat that 
the rights start losing meaning. It is suggested that the objection must be 
responded to differently. The Constitutional Court has made it clear that 
the provision of emergency housing to those rendered homeless as a result 
of evictions or other similarly exceptional circumstances is a constitutional 
responsibility of local government. Furthermore it has formulated a right 
to basic municipal services and formulated rights-based service delivery 
standards. The stakeholders to the intergovernmental fiscal system, 
comprising of various organs of state in different spheres of government, 
the National Treasury and the Financial and Fiscal Commission, must now 
bring its very considerable research and negotiation capabilities to bear to 
investigate whether changes to the intergovernmental fiscal system are needed 
to achieve greater alignment between the intergovernmental fiscal system and 
the constitutional responsibilities.
The Constitution of Kenya contains economic and social rights that are 
phrased so as to make them justiciable: they are not mere instructions to the 
state to pursue them as objectives. Key provisions are in Article 43, which 
contains various rights pertaining to health care, housing, sanitation, food, 
water, social security and education. The rights of children and persons with 
disabilities (Articles 53 and 54) also contain elements that constitute economic 
and social rights. There is no doubt that the enforcement of these rights by the 
Kenyan courts is going to affect the devolution of functions and powers. There 
is also no doubt that the Kenyan courts will develop their own jurisprudential 
principles to manage the complicated intersection, tailored to the specificities 
of the Kenyan context. However, it is hoped that the above excursion into 
some of the approaches developed by the South African Constitutional Court, 
based on a Constitution that bears remarkable similarities to the Kenyan 
Constitution, may add a useful dimension to their deliberations.
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